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Bilateral tax treaties (BTT) are intended to promote foreign direct investment and foreign affiliate
activity through double taxation relief.  However, BTTs also typically contain provisions that facilitate
sharing of tax information between countries intended to curtail tax avoidance by multinational firms.
These provisions should disproportionately affect firms that intensively use inputs for which an arms-length
price is easily observed, since strategic transfer practices that manipulate tax liabilities are no longer
effective with information sharing between countries. Using BEA firm-level data we are able to separately
estimate the impacts of double-taxation relief and sharing of tax information on investment behavior
of US multinational firms. We find a significant positive effect of new tax treaties on foreign affiliate
activity between member nations that is offset (and even reversed) the more a firm relies on inputs
traded on an organized exchange (i.e., inputs for which the arms-length price is easily observed). We
find these opposing BTT effects for both the intensive margin (sales of existing affiliates) and the
extensive margin (entry of new affiliates).
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is among the largest economic activities in an increasingly global
economy. Growth in foreign aﬃliate sales worldwide has exceeded growth in exports in recent
decades (See Markusen (2002).) Moreover, the US Census Bureau reports that in 2009 over 40%
of all imports were between related parties. The main policy tool used to promote eﬃcient ﬂows
of capital across borders is a bilateral tax treaty (BTT). The provisions of these treaties include
rules to coordinate double-taxation relief, to share information between national tax agencies, and
agreements on deﬁnitions of the tax base. Despite the substantial amount of FDI activity subject
to the provisions of these treaties, previous studies have not found signiﬁcant evidence that they
aﬀect FDI activity between member nations.
Previous empirical work on BTTs and FDI activity has primarily used data on aggregate bi-
lateral investment activity across countries and has found little evidence for any signiﬁcant rela-
tionship.1 In addition to aggregate FDI ﬂows, di Giovanni (2005) ﬁnds no robust impact of BTTs
on cross-border merger and acquisition activity. Davies et al. (2009) is the only prior study of
which we are aware to use ﬁrm-level data to examine the impact of BTTs on FDI activity. Their
study using data on Swedish multinationals ﬁnds that, while BTTs have a positive impact on the
likelihood of FDI into a host country (extensive margin), there is no evidence that it aﬀects the
volume of activity (intensive margin).
There are two potential reasons that the previous literature has found little evidence for a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of BTTs on FDI activity. First, BTTs may not impact tax rules in a way that
alters investment activity.2 Second, the many provisions within tax treaties may generate opposing
incentives for investment between treaty partners. In particular, it has been suggested (e.g., Davies
(2004)) that information sharing between governments reduces the ability of multinationals to
surreptitiously allocate proﬁts toward low tax rate countries. Thus, provisions for information
sharing may reduce investment, while double-taxation relief stimulates FDI activity, making BTTs
appear ineﬀective on net.
1Examples of such studies include Blonigen and Davies (2004), Egger et al. (2006), and Louie and Rousslang
(2008). For a thorough review of both the theoretical and empirical literatures on international tax treaties see
Davies (2004).
2There is substantial evidence that tax rates have a signiﬁcant impact on international capital mobility. See
Wilson and Wildasin (2004) for a review of this literature. The well-documented relationship between FDI and tax
competition stands at odds with the possibility that bilateral tax treaties do not aﬀect FDI patterns.
2Our objective in this paper is to separately identify the opposing eﬀects of tax relief and infor-
mation sharing on FDI activity. In the absence of information sharing agreements within a BTT,
tax authorities have little ability to verify the reported income of the foreign aﬃliates, much less
the internal transfer prices that would justify such reported income. Thus, there is a signiﬁcant
degree of implicit transfer pricing that can be employed by multinational ﬁrms when reporting
foreign-aﬃliate activity, regardless of the types of inputs that are being traded between the parent
ﬁrm and its foreign aﬃliates.3
Once a BTT is signed, provisions for information sharing substantially increase the information
that domestic tax authorities can obtain regarding foreign aﬃliate activity.4 For example, through
information-sharing arrangements the Internal Revenue Service can ask the foreign government of
a treaty partner to obtain information from foreign aﬃliates about the (transfer) prices they charge
to their parent ﬁrm, thus justifying the tax liabilities that a U.S. multinational parent ﬁrm claims
in each country. When foreign aﬃliates produce and sell relatively-homogeneous inputs to their
parent company, the introduction of a BTT severely limits any ability to shift income through
transfer pricing, due to the easy veriﬁcation of market prices for such inputs by tax authorities. On
the other hand, foreign aﬃliates producing and selling more diﬀerentiated products will continue
to have ﬂexibility in their strategic transfer pricing behavior with a BTT in place, due to the much
greater ambiguity involved in determining the true market price of diﬀerentiated inputs.
Nearly every nation implements the Arms-Length Principle to govern tax liabilities when there
are intra-ﬁrm transactions; the price for a transaction between related parties should correspond to
a price that would be paid to a third-party. In some industries, production requires several inputs
that are either traded on organized exchanges or have public listed reference prices. Our empirical
strategy exploits the fact that the arms-length price for intermediate goods is easily veriﬁed in these
industries and, hence, there is less ability to manipulate transfer prices to avoid taxation once a
BTT is in force. As a result, provisions for information sharing within tax treaties should have
3Using transaction-level data for U.S. multinationals, Clausing (2003) ﬁnds evidence of strategic transfer pricing
behavior on a wide array of intermediate goods. Furthermore, Clausing (2009) shows there are several methods by
which multinationals can mitigate their tax liabilities, highlighting ﬁnancial means such as strategic transfer pricing
and real means of avoiding taxation by shifting employment.
4See the Transfer Pricing Compliance Directive at IRS.gov for details regarding the principal and background
documentation that ﬁrms must provide upon request. Also see the PATA Documentation Package for the uniform
transfer pricing documents used by Australia, the U.S., Canada, and Japan, which also serves as model documentation
for multinationals operating in other countries.
3a much greater negative impact on ﬁrms in industries where inputs transferred within the ﬁrm
have observable arms-length prices. Bernard et al. (2006) provide direct evidence in support of this
identiﬁcation strategy. They show that intra-ﬁrm prices for diﬀerentiated products exhibit higher
price mark-ups than non-diﬀerentiated products (e.g., those available on an organized exchange).
Feenstra and Hanson (2004) ﬁnd similar evidence for entrepˆ ot traders.
Estimating these separate (and opposing) eﬀects of BTTs, requires detailed information about
FDI activity at the sectoral level. We use ﬁrm-level data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) and incorporate industry-speciﬁc characteristics about the necessity of diﬀerentiated inputs,
which captures the ability of foreign aﬃliates to engage in strategic transfer pricing. The data
coverage extends across 174 country-pairs (all including the United States) and 73 industries (3-
digit BEA International Surveys Industries (ISI), which are based on 3-digit SIC codes in non-service
sectors). With over two decades of observations we are able to compare aﬃliate activity well before
and well after the signing of a treaty. In practice tax treaties are negotiated, signed and then
put into force through a process lasting several years. The long time horizon in the data allows
us to bypass the potential confounding eﬀects of anticipated treaty enforcement within a short
span of years.5 Furthermore, the panel of establishment-level data on foreign activity allows us to
circumvent any bias due to endogenous treaty formation, as it is unlikely that any single ﬁrm can
signiﬁcantly impact the country-level decisions to form treaties.
We ﬁnd strong evidence for both of these eﬀects when looking at the intensive margin (volume
of activity for ﬁrms already in the host country prior to the BTT), as well as the extensive margin
(likelihood of new entry into the host country after a BTT is signed). There is a signiﬁcant inde-
pendent positive eﬀect of BTTs on foreign aﬃliate activity for US multinationals, but a signiﬁcant
countervailing negative eﬀect that grows with the ﬁrm’s share of inputs that are purchased with
observable arms-length prices. Once a BTT is signed, ﬁrms which use inputs intensively either
from an organized exchange, or with publicly available reference prices, can no longer engage in
strategic transfer pricing on these types of inputs, as governments can share and verify tax infor-
mation. Comparing the opposing eﬀects of BTTs, we ﬁnd that they have a signiﬁcant and positive
net impact on FDI activity for the average ﬁrm in our sample. The estimated impacts of BTTs
5Baier and Bergstrand (2007) used a similar strategy to estimate the impact of free-trade agreements on trade
ﬂows between member countries. They show that panel studies, combined with an analysis across long diﬀerences,
revealed signiﬁcant impacts of trade agreements on international commerce.
4are robust to controls for country-speciﬁc motives to engage in FDI, measures of trade openness,
changes to provisions within speciﬁc treaties, and time speciﬁc eﬀects.
The next section provides some information about tax treaties that is relevant to our estimation
strategy. Sections 3 and 4 provide details on our estimation strategy, variable construction and
data sources. Section 5 presents the key results and we conclude in section 6.
2 Background on Bilateral Tax Treaties
Most recently signed BTTs conform to the model treaties proposed by the OECD or the United
Nations. The stated goal in the preamble of the OECD model treaty is to provide common solutions
to the incidence of double-taxation. It is important to note that double-taxation relief is achieved
via provisions about tax rules, and not tax rates. The degree of coordination is limited to the
deﬁnitions of the tax base and the requirement that countries oﬀer either exemptions or credits
for foreign taxes paid. Capital income tax rates remain under the sovereign authority of each
nation. Still, Davies (2003) shows that, by prohibiting the use of deductions for foreign taxes
paid, the OECD model treaty will lead to larger incentives to invest abroad. Even without explicit
coordination in tax rates between nations, tax competition under a BTT leads to reduced tax
liabilities for multinational ﬁrms. Chisik and Davies (2004) provide direct evidence that BTTs
reduce withholding rates.
Besides coordinating deﬁnitions of the tax base and double-taxation relief methods, each model
tax treaty includes special provisions about cooperation between national tax agencies. First, BTTs
require member nations to share pertinent information. Member countries cannot simply state a
willingness to share information in good faith. Information sharing is compulsory at the request of
the tax agency in either nation. Article 26 of the OECD model treaty stipulates that each nation
must assist in the gathering of tax information, ”...even though that other State may not need such
information for its own tax purposes.” Transfer pricing documents for foreign aﬃliate sales are
one example of such information that may be requested. Article 27 further requires that member
nations assist with the collection of revenues if a taxable agent is in non-compliance. The United
States has a history of acting on treaty violations by foreign nations, leading to the suspension or
5cancelation of treaties when tax agencies refuse to share information or enforce treaty rules.6 In
short, international tax treaties include several provisions that are intended to curb the use of tax
havens and strategic transfer pricing behavior.7
On a ﬁnal note, BTTs typically require that member nations levy taxes on foreign-owned
permanent establishments and domestic ﬁrms equally. (See Article 24 of the OECD model treaty.)
These provisions are useful here because our measure of foreign direct investment is aﬃliate sales by
foreign permanent establishments. Provisions for non-discrimination ensure that BTTs oﬀer relief
from double-taxation, without additional costs attributable to foreign ownership classiﬁcations.
3 Estimation Strategy
Our goal is to measure the impact of BTTs on FDI activity, separate from the other determinants of
such activity. Thus we require an estimation framework that incorporates the motives for ﬁrms to
operate foreign aﬃliates. We ﬁrst incorporate country-level features derived from the knowledge-
capital model of FDI activity developed by Markusen (2002). Furthermore, di Giovanni (2005)
shows that the estimated eﬀects of BTTs are sensitive to the incidence of trade agreements between
countries; we add country-level controls for other trade and investment treaties. To account for
the opposing eﬀects of BTTs and potential endogeneity issues we include additional industry- and
ﬁrm- level characteristics.8
Denote FDI activity for US parent ﬁrm p, in destination country d, within industry i, during
year t as FDIActpdit. Then our baseline speciﬁcation is
FDIActpdit = f
(
Treatydt; Hom Inputi; [Hom Input  Treaty]dit; Xdt;  p; d
)
(1)
The variable Treatydt is an indicator that equals one if the destination country has a treaty in
6See Papke (2000) for a detailed analysis of ”treaty shopping” that occurred in the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba.
The US subsequently cancelled its BTT for failure to enforce rules that would limit tax evasion.
7Some of the older US treaties in our sample have looser requirements on provisions for tax sharing. When
information exchange is voluntary, the degree of cooperation can be used as an endogenous policy instrument to
inﬂuence tax competition outcomes. (See, e.g., Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995) and Dhillon et al. (1999).) This will
work against us ﬁnding negative eﬀects of BTTs due to information sharing.
8Evidence in support of the knowledge-capital model is provided by Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus
(2001, 2002). One purpose of this analysis is to highlight the opposing eﬀects of diﬀerent provisions in BTTs that
confounded previous studies. Hence our use of the knowledge-capital model also corresponds to previous work. See
Blonigen and Davies (2004, 2005). Also, di Giovanni (2005) estimated the eﬀect of BTTs on cross-border M&A
activity using similar country-level controls.
6force with the US at time t. Treaties are often signed in years previous to when they become
eﬀective. Several country-pairs have also renegotiated their BTT over time. In any case we use the
eﬀective date of the original signing to indicate when countries have a treaty in place. Measuring
the presence of a treaty this way works against ﬁnding a signiﬁcant impact on foreign investment.9
Our second key regressor, Hom Inputi, indicates how intensively ﬁrms in an industry use
homogeneous inputs. We measure homogeneous inputs as the fraction of required intermediates
that are available on an organized exchange, or have publicly quoted reference prices. For example,
corn, wheat, and petroleum can be purchased on an organized exchange with a publicly observed
price. However photographic processing materials and air compressor equipment require speciﬁc
designs, and as result their prices are determined primarily in speciﬁc contracts. Higher levels of
the variable Hom Input indicate that relatively more of the intermediate goods required within
an industry are homogeneous inputs that have easily veriﬁable prices. Values of Hom Input are
weighted by factor usages so that a value of 0:5 indicates that half of the inputs needed to generate
a single unit of output in industry i can be purchased on an organized exchange or has a public
reference price. Keller and Yeaple (2009) ﬁnd evidence of gravity eﬀects within multinational ﬁrms
such that the costs to oﬀshore production are increasing faster in technology intensive sectors; i.e.,
where diﬀerentiated inputs are likely to be used more intensively. The predicted sign of Hom Input
is positive reﬂecting the ease of using foreign aﬃliates to manufacture homogeneous inputs.
The interaction between the treaty variable and Hom Input measures the diﬀerential eﬀect
of a BTT across industries with varying potential to avoid tax liabilities. This interaction term
captures the impact of BTT provisions for sharing tax information. Strategic transfer pricing is
relatively more diﬃcult in industries that require homogeneous inputs with observable third-party
prices, which limits the incentives to operate foreign aﬃliates for tax avoidance purposes once a
BTT is in force. Thus, a new treaty is predicted to increase FDI activity relatively less in sectors
which use inputs available on organized exchanges or with reference prices available.
By now it is well-known that ﬁrms adopt diﬀerent strategies for international participation
based on diﬀerences in their productivity and size.10 Information sharing provisions may also have
9 Davies (2003) considers revisions to tax treaties and ﬁnds no impact on foreign investment activity.
10Bernard and Jensen (1999) show that more productive ﬁrms select into exporting. Yeaple (2009) provides evi-
dence that ﬁrms which operate foreign aﬃliates are on average more productive than exporters. Nocke and Yeaple
(2007, 2008) further show that multinationals which adopt greenﬁeld strategies and those that use cross-border M&A
as investment mechanisms diﬀer systematically in terms of productivity.
7varying eﬀects on ﬁrms of diﬀerent size. Desai et al. (2006) show that larger ﬁrms are more likely
to source intermediates from tax haven countries. Furthermore, Bernard et al. (2006) ﬁnd that
the price of intra-ﬁrm transactions is increasing in the size of U.S. parent companies, consistent
with larger ﬁrms engaging in tax avoidance through strategic transfer pricing more intensively.
The term  p is a parent ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect which captures, among other things, the size of the
ﬁrm without introducing a bias as most common measures of size (e.g. sales or employment) are
clearly correlated with aﬃliate sales. We estimate the impact of BTTs separately for the sample
of incumbent ﬁrms and new entrants.
We primarily rely on the empirical knowledge-capital model introduced by Carr et al. (2001) to
specify the control variables in the vector Xdt. These include SumGDP and RGDPdiff2 which
measure (in logs) the sum and squared diﬀerences in real GDP between the destination country
and the US. Larger markets motivate ﬁrms to engage in horizontal FDI activity, allowing them to
bypass trade costs when serving foreign consumers. While greater incomes promote FDI activity,
diﬀerences between national incomes are a deterrent. The variable ASkillDiff measures diﬀerences
in human capital between countries, in absolute terms. Large skill diﬀerences, which may lead to
wage diﬀerences, capture the incentives of ﬁrms to engage in vertical FDI activity.
Higher costs to import goods from the foreign country (TCostdt) reduce the incentives to acquire
foreign production facilities, as intermediates inputs are more expensive to acquire. On the other
hand, higher costs to export to a foreign country promote investment activity as ﬁrms can avoid
trade costs by serving foreign consumers with foreign production facilities. We also include annual
measures of the exchange rate between countries. As suggested by di Giovanni (2005) other trade
and investment opportunities can mitigate the impact of BTTs. We add indicator variables for
country pairs that equal unity if they have a free trade agreement (FTA) or bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) in place. It is plausible that nations pursue treaties only with their most preferred
investment destinations, or with nations most likely to act as tax havens.
Also, BTTs require several years of deliberation, suggesting that the proliferation of treaties
may proceed according to the political ease with which they can be negotiated.11 To account
for other unobserved country-level characteristics we include destination country ﬁxed eﬀects, d.
Since all observations are from the US, the term d is tantamount to country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects.
11The issue of endogenous treaty formation is examined by Hines Jr. and Willard (1992) and Egger et al. (2006).
84 Data
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) collects ﬁrm-level data on US multinational company
operations in its annual surveys of US direct investment abroad. We use data on total sales by
foreign aﬃliates of US owned ﬁrms from these surveys as our measure of FDI activity, since it
is a measure of real economic activity by foreign aﬃliates. Each aﬃliate is assigned an industry
classiﬁcation based on its primary activity according to the BEA International Surveys Industry
(ISI) system, which closely follows the 3-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) system. We
focus on non-service sectors, giving us a set of ﬁrms spanning 73 3-digit industries and operating
in 174 countries from 1987 to 2007.
Information about international tax treaties signed by the US come from Internal Revenue
Service and Treasury Department publications.12 The text of each treaty provides the signature
date, ratiﬁcation date, the general eﬀective date, and the date of revisions if applicable. For all
countries we use the general eﬀective date to measure when a BTT is in force. Treaties vary in the
extent to which information sharing is compulsory, and in the responsibilities of member nations to
gather relevant information from resident aﬃliates. We do not distinguish treaties by the intensity
with which they try to limit tax avoidance, nor the changes in provisions over time; this may lead
to substantial heterogeneity in the eﬀect of BTTs across countries and years. To account for these
potential sources of variation in impacts when we evaluate the statistical signiﬁcance of BTT eﬀects
we cluster standard errors by country-year.
Our key industry characteristic is the share of inputs traded on an organized exchange or with a
published reference price. There are two components to these data. First, Rauch (1999) documented
which goods are traded on an organized exchange, are exchanged through speciﬁc contracts, and
which are oﬀered at referenced prices. Products are classiﬁed at a highly disaggregated level.
Second, Nunn (2007) uses US input-output tables to measure the intensity with which each input
is used in the industry-speciﬁc production process. These data provide detailed information about
the variation factor usages by their level of product diﬀerentiation.
The original industry-level data on factor usages correspond to the 4-digit SITC revision 2 clas-
siﬁcation system, which we convert to 3-digit SIC-based ISI codes using correspondences available
12See IRS.gov, United States Income Tax Treaties A-Z.
9from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. When the 3-digit level spans observations for several
4-digit industries, we use the average fraction of inputs traded on an organized exchange or with
an available reference price. Data on industry-level characteristics are limited to observations from
the US for a single year, and so we must treat them as constant across all countries and years.
After aggregating we have coverage for 73 separate industries concentrated in non-service sectors.13
Country-level data are compiled from several sources. Information regarding real GDP and
trade barriers come from the Penn-World tables. National incomes are expressed in trillions of
US dollars. Trade costs are measured using standard deﬁnitions of openness: 100 minus the trade
share of total GDP. Skill diﬀerences across country-pairs are measured using estimates of average
educational attainment by Barro and Lee (2010). Observations of educational attainment in each
country are available every ﬁve years; we interpolate data for years between observations on a linear
scale. Our country-level data contain observations for 137 countries.
We also control for other factors that may inﬂuence foreign aﬃliate sales. Data indicating
whether the US has a bilateral investment treaty with the destination country are from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The incidence of free trade agreements
across countries are available from the US Trade Representative. Annual exchange rate data are
from the World Bank. Table 1 provides summary statistics for each variable used to estimate the
impact of BTTs.
(Insert Table 1 here)
5 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst consider the aggregate impact of BTTs to demonstrate that, as found by
previous studies, tax treaties appear ineﬀective if we do not correctly specify the roles of double
taxation relief and information sharing between nations. We then provide results from estimating
the separate and opposing eﬀects of BTTs. New treaties lead to signiﬁcant changes in ﬁrm-level
FDI activity which diﬀer across industries, and on average increase foreign aﬃliate activity.
13The use of aggregated sector data in driven completely by data constraints. But it is worth noting that this
aggregation limits the variation in the measures of inputs traded on organized exchanges, working against obtaining
signiﬁcant estimates of the impacts of treaties across industries.
105.1 The Aggregate Eﬀects of BTTs
Previous studies of BTTs concentrated on aggregate investment ﬂows and found little evidence
that they were eﬀective. In Table 2 we aggregate our data to see if the net eﬀect of BTTs also
appears insigniﬁcant in our sample. Each regression in Table 2 includes country ﬁxed eﬀects so
that the eﬀect of BTTs is identiﬁed within countries that switch treaty status over time. With
our identifying variation being within countries over time, we report clustered standard errors by
country-year. Column (1) is consistent with previous studies which ﬁnd that new treaties have no
discernible eﬀect on FDI activity between member nations. In fact, once we have accounted for
time trends, country characteristics and relative trading opportunities through FTAs or exchange
rate movements in columns (2) and (3), the country-level evidences suggests that BTTs may have
a negative impact on FDI activity.14
A key advantage of our data is that we observe foreign aﬃliate activity for each parent ﬁrm.
This means, ﬁrst of all, that the endogeneity of BTTs with FDI activity is much less of an issue than
with country-level analysis - the signing of a BTT is plausibly an exogenous shock to any single ﬁrm
within a country. In addition, ﬁrm-level information provides a greater number of observations per
year within each country-pair that signs a new treaty and allows us to account for heterogeneity in
responses of ﬁrms headquartered in the same country.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 report the coeﬃcient estimates using ﬁrm-level FDI activity, where
the endogeneity of treaty formation is much less of a concern. Each speciﬁcation includes both
country and parent ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. At the more disaggregated ﬁrm-level, we still ﬁnd that the
net eﬀect of BTTs on FDI activity between countries is insigniﬁcant. The apparent lack of impact
cannot be attributed to a bias from endogenous treaty formation as the shock of a new treaty does
not increase aﬃliate activity for individual ﬁrms, nor is the apparent ineﬀectiveness of BTTs simply
a result of weak statistical power available at the country-level. In summary, our data indicate the
same ineﬀectiveness of BTTs as found in previous studies. The next step is to disentangle the
opposing eﬀect of diﬀerent provisions within BTTs.
(Insert Table 2 here.)
14The apparent negative eﬀects of BTTs are similar to the results of Blonigen and Davies (2004), who found weak
evidence of reductions in FDI activity looking at the country-level over a shorter time span than in our sample.
115.2 Separating Two Opposing Eﬀects of BTTs on FDI Activity
The necessity of homogeneous or diﬀerentiated inputs is an exogenous characteristic of the produc-
tion process for ﬁrms in each industry. As a result we can use cross-sectional variation in require-
ments for homogeneous inputs to identify the diﬀerential impacts of tax treaties where the potential
for strategic transfer pricing varies. Table 3 presents the coeﬃcients obtained when estimating (1)
allowing for diﬀerential impacts across ﬁrms from diﬀerent industries. Each speciﬁcation in Table
3 includes country and parent ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, with all standard errors clustered by country-year.
(Insert Table 3 here)
Our results provide strong evidence that there are two opposing eﬀects of BTTs on foreign
aﬃliate sales. There is now an estimated positive coeﬃcient on the BTT variable that is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The positive eﬀect of BTTs is consistent with provisions for double
taxation relief increasing ﬁrm incentives to invest in new treaty partners. In addition to the other
beneﬁts to investment within BTTs, evidence that they lower withholding tax rates is available
from Chisik and Davies (2004).
The evidence in Table 3 also suggests that the positive eﬀect of BTTs is mitigated for ﬁrms
operating in industries where a high fraction of required inputs are homogeneous intermediate
goods, as indicated by the statistically signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the interaction between
BTT and the fraction of required inputs from organized exchanges or with public reference prices.
This latter eﬀect is consistent with our hypothesis that the ability of ﬁrms to mitigate tax liabilities
via strategic transfer price is reduced more by BTTs for ﬁrms from industries that use homogeneous
inputs intensively. It is worth noting that the estimated independent eﬀect of Hom Input also
has a highly signiﬁcant relationship with foreign aﬃliate sales in each speciﬁcation. The positive
coeﬃcient on the Hom Input variable is consistent with the notion by Keller and Yeaple (2009)
that oﬀshore production is facilitated by the use of homogeneous inputs.
While several countries entered a new BTT with the US during our sample, no treaty was
canceled or suspended. Since we only observe the addition of new treaty partners over time we
must also check that our results are not driven by a general time trend. In columns (4)-(6) of Table
3 we estimate the impact of a BTT on the deviation from trends in FDI activity. Foreign aﬃliate
sales do appear to rise independently over time. Also, the growth in foreign aﬃliate sales is slower
12in industries that use homogeneous inputs, consistent with countries increasing enforcement of tax
rules over time. Looking beyond the trends in foreign aﬃliate sales we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant gross
reductions in foreign aﬃliate sales where treaties make transfer pricing strategies less viable.15
The marginal eﬀects of our coeﬃcient estimates suggest that these eﬀects are economically
signiﬁcant as well. First, we can use the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction term from our
preferred speciﬁcation in column (6) to estimate the average negative eﬀect on foreign aﬃliate
activity from the deterrence of strategic transfer pricing due to the information-sharing provisions
of BTTs. For the average industry, about 45% of required inputs are homogeneous intermediates
with easily veriﬁed arms-length prices. Using this value together with the estimated coeﬃcient on
the interaction term of -58.59 from our estimates in column (6), we calculate a gross reduction of
approximately $US 26 million in foreign aﬃliate sales for a ﬁrm in the average industry due to
strategic transfer pricing deterrence of BTTs. Adding this up across all ﬁrms and industries and
BTTs in our sample, this means a gross reduction in US outbound FDI activity to each treaty
partner by $US 2.29 billion per year.
These estimated reductions in aﬃliate activity as national tax agencies cooperate to reduce
strategic transfer pricing practices are quite large, although previous evidence has also shown
that strategic transfer pricing behavior by multinational ﬁrms is quite pervasive. Clausing (2003)
examines comprehensive transaction-level data for US multinationals and ﬁnds that goods shipped
from aﬃliates in low tax countries typically occur at higher prices. Similarly Feenstra and Hanson
(2004) ﬁnd that highly disaggregated goods shipped from Hong Kong intermediaries exhibit greater
markups when sent to high tax countries. These strategies shift taxable earnings from parent ﬁrms
in high tax locations toward aﬃliates in low tax countries.
We can also use our estimates to examine the net eﬀect of BTTs on foreign aﬃliate sales within
new treaty partners - summing both the positive eﬀect estimated by the coeﬃcient on the BTT
variable and the negative eﬀect estimated by the negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term. For a
ﬁrm in an industry using the sample average share of homogeneous inputs (45%), the net eﬀect of
a treaty is positive and approximately $16 million. Aggregating across all ﬁrms and industries, the
net increase in aﬃliate sales is approximately $1.48 billion after a new BTT is signed. An F-test
15There may be other non-linear time eﬀects that inﬂuence FDI activity that are not captured by a simple trend.
Estimating the model with year ﬁxed eﬀects yields quantitatively similar estimated eﬀects, with no loss in statistical
signiﬁcance.
13also ﬁnds this net eﬀect to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Clearly, ﬁrms using less than
the average share of inputs with observable arms-length prices experience a positive and signiﬁcant
net eﬀect of a BTT on foreign aﬃliate sales as well. But there are also ﬁrms in our sample for
which the estimated net eﬀect of the BTTs is negative. The estimated eﬀect of a BTT eﬀect is
zero when the share of homogeneous inputs required during production is 73%, and we have ﬁrms
from sectors in our sample where this share is up to 85%.
In summary, the estimated coeﬃcient for the interaction term between a treaty and the require-
ment of homogeneous inputs in Table 3 is consistent with a negative gross eﬀect due to information
sharing. On the other hand, the positive coeﬃcient on the Treaty variable demonstrates that
reductions in the incidence of double taxation promote FDI activity. Controlling for the opposing
eﬀects of tax relief and information sharing, we ﬁnd a net positive tax treaty eﬀect on the foreign
aﬃliate sales of a ﬁrm using the average percentage of inputs with observable arms-length prices.
At ﬁrst it may be surprising that we obtain a positive and signiﬁcant net eﬀect of BTTs
on foreign aﬃliate sales only after controlling for industry-speciﬁc requirements for homogeneous
inputs. In many previous studies, as well as in our sample, the net eﬀects of new treaties were
consistently estimated to be zero using an empirical speciﬁcation that only controlled for country-
level characteristics. However it is important to recognize that the use of homogeneous inputs
informs about both the ability to use foreign aﬃliates for tax avoidance, and the ease of oﬀshoring
production within each industry. As a result, omitting information about the use of diﬀerentiated
inputs biases estimates of the net impact of BTTs toward zero.16 We are able to detect a net
increase in activity here because in each speciﬁcation we allow industry-speciﬁc features to interact
with treaty status at the national level.
5.3 BTTs and New Entry
The previous section showed that double taxation relief and reduced transfer pricing opportunities
both lead to a signiﬁcant impact of BTTs on foreign aﬃliate activity for ﬁrms with existing foreign
aﬃliate sales - i.e., BTTs have eﬀects at the intensive margin. In this section we turn to the
16Note that the coeﬃcient on Hom Input is highly signiﬁcant in each speciﬁcation, and the coeﬃcient on the treaty
variable is sensitive to its inclusion in the estimation, suggesting an omitted variable bias. Comparing the results for
ﬁrm-level regressions across tables (2) and (3), the estimated coeﬃcient on the treaty variable is larger by more than
an order of magnitude when controlling for the use of homogeneous inputs.
14extensive margin. The eﬀects of BTTs on ﬁrm entry rates can have far reaching consequences as
domestic ﬁrms respond to changes in the number of foreign competitors.17 Also, even if the net
change in entry rates are small at the country-level, the large diﬀerences in the impacts of BTTs
across sectors can have signiﬁcant consequences across domestic industries.
We estimate the eﬀect of tax treaties on the number of new foreign aﬃliate entrants into a
partner country per year. For each speciﬁcation in Table 4 we continue to include country ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects, but cannot include parent-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects since we are examining entry. We continue
to report standard errors clustered by country-year.
As with the intensive margin, we ﬁnd that the net eﬀect of BTTs on entry rates appears
insigniﬁcant when we specify the model using only country-level characteristics (e.g., see columns
(2) and (3) of table 4). However, when we again control for the opposing incentives within treaties,
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes in entry rates once a treaty is in force. Results in columns (4)-(6)
demonstrate that a BTT leads to a gross increase of about 0.80 to 0.93 new aﬃliates that enter
each year into sectors that use no homogeneous inputs, depending on speciﬁcation. However, the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term between BTT and the Hom Input variables is negative and
signiﬁcant, indicating that this positive eﬀect on sectoral entry from a BTT declines the more a
sector relies on inputs with observable arms-length prices. The rationale for these eﬀects is the
same as that for our estimates of the BTT eﬀects on the intensive margin. BTTs are less likely to
encourage new ﬁrms to invest in a partner country in sectors that require homogeneous inputs, since
strategic transfer pricing is diﬃcult when tax authorities have information-sharing arrangements.
For ﬁrms in an average sector (with 45% of intermediates being homogeneous goods) the increase
in the net entry rate is about 0.15 new ﬁrms per sector per year once a BTT is in force, which is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. With 73 sectors, the total eﬀect on a country level is then
about 11 new entrants a year, which is quite sizable. At the beginning of our sample in 1988 the
average number of new entrants per country was 4.8 and by the end of our sample in 2006, entry
rates had increased steadily to 6.1 new ﬁrms per nation.18 Thus our estimate of approximately 11
17 Aghion et al. (2004) estimate the eﬀects of new multinational entrants on domestic incumbent ﬁrms. They ﬁnd
signiﬁcant increases in ﬁrm-level eﬃciency that contributed substantially to aggregate productivity growth. In the
US, Keller and Yeaple (2009) ﬁnd additional evidence of spillovers from the entry of new multinationals.
18The threshold cutoﬀ for ﬁrms included in BEA surveys varies across year due to, among other things, budget
concerns. With the exception of BEA benchmark years, the average rate of entry is near ﬁve to six ﬁrms. Since we
can control for the annual diﬀerences in the composition of ﬁrms reporting to the BEA in our regression analysis, it
is easiest to simply compare our ﬁndings to entry rates at various points of time in our sample.
15new aﬃliates per year where a BTT is in force is about twice the average rate of entry for any
given year in our sample.19
6 Conclusion
Previous studies of BTT have found little evidence that they have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on FDI activity
between member nations. There are several reasons why this is surprising. To begin, nearly half of
all US trade is within ﬁrms. The amount of economic activity that is subject to the provisions of tax
treaties is quite large, which should lead to large consequences when new BTTs are signed. Model
treaties from the OECD and UN state their primary goal as the elimination of double-taxation on
foreign capital income. It is curious then that the actual tax rates and tax competition between
states has been shown to impact capital ﬂows, but tax treaties do not.
In this analysis we found that small net changes in foreign investment between countries mask
large reallocations of economic activity after a tax treaty is signed. Separating the opposing impacts
of double-taxation relief and information sharing demonstrates that bilateral tax treaties generate
sector-speciﬁc shocks in the incentives to oﬀshore production. The gross eﬀects of these diﬀerent
provisions are large: at the intensive margin a BTT increases US outbound FDI activity to treaty
members by $US 3.77 billion per year via double-taxation relief, and simultaneously decreases
foreign aﬃliate activity by $US 2.29 billion through the increased cooperation between national
tax agencies.
19Although they do not account for the diﬀerent eﬀects of BTTs, Davies et al. (2009) also ﬁnd evidence of increased
entry rates in their analysis as well.
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18Table 1: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Aﬃliate Sales 253747 94.39 532.00 (conﬁdential)
BTT 253747 0.793 0.405 0 1
Homogeneous Inputs 253747 0.451 0.228 0.053 0.831
Sum GDP (log) 253747 9.336 0.213 8.866 10.09
GDP Diﬀ2 253747 18.19 0.536 14.84 18.93
Skill Diﬀ 253747 1.132 0.752 -2.767 2.494
Trade Costs 253747 2.777 2.291 -3.203 4.489
BIT 253747 0.056 0.229 0 1
Exchange Rate 253747 182.2 1020.9 0 16105.1
FTA 253747 0.130 0.336 0 1
No. New Aﬃliates (1988) 109 4.817 10.12 (conﬁdential)
No. New Aﬃliates (2006) 149 6.10 14.56 (conﬁdential)
Table 2: Eﬀects of Bilateral Tax Treaties at Aggregate Levels
Aﬃliate Sales by Country Aﬃliate Sales by Firm
($US Billions) ($US Millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BTT -1.307 -3.030* -3.234** 2.297 3.150 -1.742
(1.398) (1.446) (1.104) (3.889) (3.956) (3.073)
Trend 0.816** 0.357 0.246 2.934** 7.279** 7.199**
(0.066) (0.542) (0.544) (0.270) (1.593) (1.578)
Sum GDP 46.852** 50.950** -57.934 -63.226
(log) (13.448) (13.341) (40.705) (39.892)
GDP Diﬀ2 -17.780** -17.066** -41.849** -42.499**
(log) (2.076) (2.063) (13.141) (13.019)
Skill Diﬀ -13.741** -13.127** 4.737 4.769
(log) (2.849) (2.858) (3.633) (4.434)
Trade Costs -0.204 -0.246 -1.549 -1.953







Constant 261.391** 165.084 95.663 119.547** 1369.344** 1417.564**
(18.863) (137.949) (135.715) (5.087) (418.416) (411.581)
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
R-sq 0.887 0.891 0.897 0.01 0.01 0.01
No. Obs 3397 2553 2499 424421 412052 407096
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses: p<0.05=*, p<0.01=**
19Table 3: Separating the Opposing Eﬀects of Bilateral Tax Treaties
Foreign Aﬃliate Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BTT 54.735** 54.553** 43.525** 54.371** 53.902** 42.748**
(13.093) (13.293) (11.603) (12.789) (12.962) (11.329)
BTT x -67.338** -64.946** -60.969** -65.295** -62.633** -58.588**
Hom Input (13.740) (13.960) (14.479) (13.401) (13.577) (14.066)
194.932** 193.848** 191.692** 241.124** 240.926** 237.554**
Hom Input (12.414) (12.560) (12.985) (21.171) (21.629) (22.062)
Trend 4.652** 3.541 3.334 6.518** 5.253* 5.015*
(0.363) (1.958) (1.895) (0.969) (2.151) (2.109)
Sum GDP 89.328 83.452 95.433 88.743
(log) (49.589) (47.461) (49.355) (47.192)
GDP Diﬀ2 -32.453* -33.825* -31.881* -33.316*
(log) (13.757) (13.712) (13.829) (13.774)
Skill Diﬀ -4.352 -4.783 -3.451 -3.982
(log) (4.574) (4.269) (4.560) (4.271)
Trade Costs -2.163 -3.306 -2.141 -3.326







Year x -3.887* -3.983* -3.889*
Hom Input (1.543) (1.568) (1.586)
Constant 25.594* -190.343 -124.187 1.973 -279.531 -203.874
(12.619) (521.971) (503.013) (16.109) (522.026) (502.630)
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-sq 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
No. Obs. 260466 257231 253747 260466 257231 253747
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses: p<0.05=*, p<0.01=**
20Table 4: The Eﬀects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on Entry Rates
No. New Aﬃliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BTT 0.179 0.084 0.060 0.927** 0.804** 0.796**
(0.176) (0.171) (0.163) (0.224) (0.214) (0.206)
BTT x -1.496** -1.442** -1.475**
Hom Input (0.253) (0.256) (0.256)
Hom Input -0.262** -0.335** -0.305**
(0.097) (0.103) (0.104)
Trend 0.015* -0.566** -0.574** 0.014* -0.568** -0.576**
(0.007) (0.088) (0.091) (0.007) (0.089) (0.091)
Sum GDP 14.746** 14.942** 14.778** 14.979**
(log) (2.338) (2.392) (2.341) (2.395)
GDP Diﬀ2 1.846** 1.867** 1.847** 1.869**
(log) (0.358) (0.362) (0.358) (0.362)
Skill Diﬀ -0.158 -0.142 -0.160 -0.144
(log) (0.206) (0.208) (0.206) (0.208)
Trade Costs 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.027







Constant 1.565* -162.012** -164.297** 1.708** -162.147** -164.499**
(0.634) (24.985) (25.578) (0.638) (25.011) (25.605)
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
R-sq 0.044 0.062 0.062 0.054 0.072 0.073
No. Obs 45622 44431 43487 45622 44431 43487
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses: p<0.05=*, p<0.01=**
21